Abstract: Since Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) collection and disposal has been a free public service in many Chinese cities, many local governments in China are facing the problem of insufficient funding. A number of municipal authorities in China have adopted marketisation (the Chinese equivalence for privatisation) to relieve local governments' financial burdens in solid waste management. This paper will use the experience of Guangzhou, the third wealthiest city in China, to illustrate how marketisation in waste management is being carried out, what problems it is confronting and what remedial measures are needed to sustain marketisation.
Introduction
Since 1979, China under the open door policy and market system reform has witnessed more and more non-State-Owned Enterprises (non-SOEs) emerging along with the introduction of bonus systems in SOEs and contract responsibility systems in governments. During this period of varied economic growth and decentralisation in profit retention and economic investment decisions in China, central government no longer guarantees financial rescue for floundering localities. Since the revenue generated from the provision of public goods (such as sewage treatment, healthcare and public transport) is generally unable to cover the full cost of the service, local governments (especially those of the less prosperous cities) are facing the problem of insufficient funding over the provision of public goods. Waste management is one of these public goods. In China, household waste is the major component of Municipal Solid Waste (MSW), which also includes commercial waste, institutional waste and street cleansing, and are managed by the environmental sanitation agencies. Industrial waste whether hazardous or non-hazardous in nature is not considered MSW and is controlled by the Environmental Protection Bureaux. This study will focus on the marketisation issue of MSW only. In a lot of cities in China, the collection and disposal of MSW have been and still are provided free of charge (Liu and Xu, 2004; Zheng, 2007, pers. comm.) . Against this background, marketisation is seen as an effective way to relieve local governments' financial burdens. This is particularly the case with the city of Guangzhou.
This paper uses the experience of Guangzhou, the third wealthiest city in China, to illustrate how marketisation in waste management is being carried out, what problems it is confronting and what remedial measures are needed to sustain marketisation. As the Chinese marketisation closely resembles privatisation in Western countries (references and further discussion are provided and found in Section 2.1), to provide the basis of assessment, a succinct review of the Western experience on privatisation of waste management services is also included. This paper concludes by determining whether marketisation is the right policy for effective waste management in Guangzhou and what conditions are to be met further.
East and West marketisation
Marketisation is a term coined by the Chinese leaders in the process to introduce market economy elements into the SOEs and its local governments. An indispensable component of marketisation is enterprisation. Previously, scholars have used this term to denote an emergence of a full-blown market (Parish et al., 1995) or market dependency (Nee, 1992) .
Pilot programmes on marketisation of waste management services in Guangzhou began in the late 1990s. By the turn of the century, marketisation has become a policy direction for the whole country (Xu, 2001; Municipal Government of Guangzhou, 2000) . For example, in the 10th Five Year Environmental Plan (2001 Plan ( -2005 for Guangzhou, marketisation of sewage and solid waste treatment infrastructure was mentioned as a policy direction (Guangzhou Development and Planning Commission, 2002) . The edict is also echoed by the provincial government in later documents, such as Guangdong Municipal Waste Management Regulations in 2001 (article 19) and the "Notification on strengthening the management of solid waste incineration and related issues" in 2002.
In a notice issued jointly by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Construction and the State Environmental Protection Administration, it was pointed out that waste management systems in China will undergo the "uncoupling of politics and business" and of "policies and operational issues". Competition will be invited through tendering, franchising or out-contracting of waste management services (Zhujiang Environmental News, 2002 ). Yet, heretofore, waste management and environmental hygiene services still remain government's responsibilities and are mainly funded by government expenditure.
Marketisation and privatisation
Privatisation has an amalgamation of meanings in Western literature (Weimer and Vining, 1992; LaCourse Korosec, 1993) : i the switch from agency subventions to user fees ii the contracting out of the provision of a good, which was previously produced by a government bureau, and the outside or private agents are competitively engaged in the process iii denationalisation and devestiture, or the selling of SOEs to the private sector iv demonopolisation, liberalisation and deregulation, the process by which the government relaxes or eliminates restrictions that prevent private firms from competing with government bureaus or SOEs.
Scholars tend to select the perspective that underpins their ideologies. For instance, Delmon (2000) will endorse iii only, Bienen and Waterbury (1989) and Farazmand (2001) adopted ii and iii only, Starr (1989) and Kikeri et al. (1994) , respectively, put their emphasis on iv and iii only and Ramanadham (1989) took privatisation to mean iii and iv. In China, the marketisation of waste management system embraces meanings i, ii and iv but the emphasis is on ii, particularly in recent years of waste management marketisation. However, to the lower-level waste management agencies in Guangzhou, marketisation mostly means to them as the loss of job security and tenure for cadres and crew members and the discontinuation of financial underwriting for the agency (Liang, 1999) . To the local governments, it means reducing direct government spending on waste management services (Chi, 2002, pers. comm . Deputy Director of Guangzhou ESB, Guangzhou, on 27 September).
Why Marketisation?
Whereas the present nominal cost of waste management in China is still relatively low by Western standard, waste management costs in Guangzhou had actually soared by 230% within the past decade (Chung and Poon, 2001; Municipal Government of Guangzhou, 2002a) . There are two reasons for this. First, the demand for waste management has been growing rapidly in last few years. Specifically, MSW of the Guangdong Province is growing at 6-10% per annum for recent years (Lei, 2001 ). More worrying is that in the 10th Five Year Plan (FYP), Guangdong intends to achieve at least 40% in its urbanisation rate, compared with the present 31.5% (Lei, 2001) . By definition, more urbanisation means more urban waste generators. Second, the unitary cost of waste management is expected to skyrocket soon. In China, including Guangzhou, low waste management cost has been associated with low standard of service. MSW is being accumulated or dumped outdoor in an uncontrolled manner in China. Even when collected, most of the landfills in use are below the national standards defined in the Technical Standards on Sanitary Landfills for MSW (CJJ17-88). Yet, the low-standard waste management service is not just environmentally unacceptable, but also incompatible with the desire to become a modern nation. As a result, it has been projected that the expenses on waste management will soar further in the coming years.
The expected rise in waste management expenses is a problem not only for the less economically developed Chinese cities, but also for the first tiered cities in China. In Guangzhou, landfilling one tonne of waste at the past generation of landfills was RMB19.8 (US$ 2.62) (Chung and Poon, 2001) . But, for the present generation of waste disposal facilities, the net averaged running cost alone amounts to RMB65 (US$ 8.59)/tonne (Municipal Government of Guangzhou, 2002a) . Similarly, non-disposal waste management expenses have been increasing at 10% per annum for the past few years, and in 2001, waste management expenditure mounted to nearly RMB 600 million (US$ 79.3 million) or about RMB800 (US$ 105.7) per head (Liang, 2002b; Environmental Sanitation Bureau (ESB), 2002; Guangzhou Urban Appearance and Environmental Sanitation Bureau, 2002) . As a result, there is the worry that future expenditure on waste management may not be affordable if government budgetary funds are the only source of funding. On the other hand, as the growth rate of the private sector in China gains momentum, hopefully more wealth will translate into higher disposable income for normal citizens, close the widening income gap and increase the general public's willingness to pay for better environmental services.
The Chinese leaders believed that there are several advantages in marketising municipal services. First, it is believed that enterprises can provide the same services with much lower cost than government agencies can. Second, government departments can be more impartial in the supervision of the services in question. Third, marketisation prompts the adoption of user-pays-principle in the services or goods concerned, thus relieving the financial burden of the government in waste management. In Guangzhou, raising waste charges to the cost recovery (plus profit) level is part of the marketisation programme (Liang, 1999 (Liang, , 2002b . Fourth, additional tax revenue is expected, as all newly marketised entities are now subject to taxation. These are similarly believed to be the merits of privatisation (LaCourse Korosec, 1993) .
Other perceived advantages of out-contracting the provision of services or goods include having better prospect of deploying newer and better technologies and management (Zhao and Zhang, 2000) , indirectly enhance the development of related industries, and get private financiers and experienced industry professionals involved (Delmon, 2000) . The ideal results of privatisation (or marketisation) are, therefore, cheaper, better and more efficiently used services.
3 The experience and assessment criteria of privatisation in developing and developed countries Similar initiatives to improve municipal services through involving or deploying the resources from the private sector have been found in other developing countries. This is carried out in several forms including self-help and volunteerism, out-contract and franchise agreements, but the most commonly used option is out-contract (LaCourse Korosec, 1993) . In contracting out a service, the government pays a private or outside organisation to provide a specific level and quality of service. For franchise agreements, a local government will limit the number of vendors in the provision of a particular service within a certain area and the service providers are paid directly by service users, such as individual citizens (International City Management Association, 1989) . Despite Savas's (2000) claim that solid waste collection is the most studied area in the privatisation of municipal service, there is a dearth of study on the privatisation experience in waste management services of developing countries. Efforts have been made to gather relevant experience for this brief review. It is a commonly cited rationale that since governments are short of capital, staff, equipment, facilities or expertise to take up some of the responsibilities, the private sector is being looked upon as alternative financial resources and a cost-effective source of expertise. These are similarly the reasons for marketising waste management system in Guangzhou and China.
Despite some cost-saving successes reported (see LaCourse Korosec, 1993) , there is also a grimmer side for privatisation in developed countries. Privatisation in the US federal government has resulted at times in mismanaged, overpriced or shoddy work, and as contractors are becoming more influential, cost overruns, bribery, loss of government in-house expertise and undermining of the civil service system through contract patronage are not uncommon (LaCourse Korosec, 1993; Hanrahan, 1983) . The catch to lower unit cost for privatised firms in comparison with public enterprise can be summed up by Borcherding et al.'s (1982) conclusion that "it is not so much the difference in … ownership but the lack of competition which leads to the often observed less efficient production in public firms". If the factor of competition is held constant, the difference in unit cost is insignificant between the two. Hardoy et al. (1992) also concluded that the extent to which privatisation can solve the problem in developing countries is greatly overstated. In fact, privatisation of water supply results in high prices and poor quality of water in the developing world (Hardoy et al., 1992) . As replacing government monopoly by a single contractor monopoly does not necessarily entail lower cost in the long run, many governments try to encourage competition among private firms or between private firms and the government itself (International City Management Association, 1989) .
In addition, not all infrastructure and service provision is an attractive investment for private companies. Without government's guarantee of continued demand or contractual payment, private companies will be reluctant to carry out capital-intensive projects or extend services to impecunious areas or parties. Even when the private sector is willing to invest in capital-intensive projects, since most of these goods are natural monopolies, such as landfill sites, vigorous regulation from local governments is required to ensure that the private companies are providing affordable and acceptable services to the community.
A perceived advantage for privatising municipal service is that it has greater efficiency in collecting payment for services provided (Hardoy et al., 1992) and thus can make the municipal service financially sustainable and reduce cross-subsidisation. This is an advantage only if service cost is reasonably set. Ways to ensure that prices are reasonable and affordable include allowing competition especially when the service is not a natural monopoly (such as micro-waste collection) and government regulation.
In developing cities, the results for waste management privatisation are also mixed. In Dar-es-Salaam, privatisation of waste collection begun in 1994 by allowing competitive bidding of waste collection for 10 city-centre wards. Whereas some improvement in city's cleanliness and some additional employment were noted (Halla and Majani, 1999) , the scheme is not entirely successful, as the waste generators were reluctant to pay the unaffordable charge directly to contractors and there is a lack of supervision from the City Commission on the contractors (Halla and Majani, 1999) . More serious failure in the privatisation of MSW management has been experienced in West Africa. Reasons for the failure include the use of unaffordable foreign technologies, which are not totally proven and inappropriate to local communities, lack of transparency in the procedures, poor monitoring of contractor performance and lack of means to impose penalties on the contractors (Paris, 2002) . On the other hand, privatisation of primary waste collection and street cleansing in Hyderabad, India, is found to be successful where youth unemployment problem is alleviated, the cost of waste management is reduced and better service has been offered.
A central question to privatisation is why cost reduction is possible? On the basis of their study on India's case, Kishore and Babu (2002) suggested that private contractors are able to employ labour at half of wages of a regular municipal worker and at the same time comply with stricter monitoring parameters probably owing to the involvement of local resident representation groups in the supervision of contractors.
International City Management Association (1989) and Stevens (1984) suggested a number of generic reasons for cost advantage in privatising public service, including the possibility to hire temporary, part-time, seasonal, or more junior workers, who command lower wages, less paid time-off and less fringe benefits than full-time, permanent, longer tenure public service workers, greater flexibility in the trade-off in the use of labour and equipment, greater ability to minimise equipment and labour redundancy and poorly performed workers, are more likely to be penalised. The ability of the private sector to hire lower-waged workers is also a reason for cost saving for marketised waste management companies. For instance, whereas government agencies tend to hire permanent residents of Guangzhou for a monthly wage of RMB780 (US$ 103) in addition to a monthly social security insurance premium of RMB500 (US$ 66.1), private cleaning firms are in free hands to hire non-permanent residents at the same wage rate while paying only RMB280 (US$ 37) per worker for his/her monthly social security insurance premium (Gu, 2007, personal communication) . In short, whereas there seems to be more failure than success noted in developing world cities, critical features can still be identified from successful privatisation schemes. So, when used properly, privatisation can foster efficiency through market competition but privatisation is not the best alternative for every government in every situation.
To provide a basis for evaluation and assessment for this case, we have identified four factors for determining the success of a privatisation scheme, namely political, legal, market-based factors and administrative capacity with each elaborated here (Brook and Smith, 2001; CGEA-Onyx, 2001 ; International City Management Association, 1989):
• Political: whether the government can engender internal and external support.
External support is referred to here as public support.
• Legal: whether there is a predictable and stable legal environment for private party participation; whether new institutions arising as a result of marketisation are legally endorsed and whether the country's legal framework encourages private involvement.
• Market based: privatisation scheme is more likely to be successful if there are a lot of potential suppliers and suppliers are less likely to capitalise on the lack of competition.
• Administrative capacity: whether the managers of government agencies have the basic tools and systems which include appropriately designed contracts, transparent project procedures, effective performance-monitoring systems on the vendors and back-up against service disruption. The monitoring system should further include a system for documenting problems and communicating to the contractor, penalties for non-performance and training of government employees for contract monitoring.
The marketisation of waste management in Guangzhou

Waste management structure in Guangzhou
It is essential to first understand the structure of the MSW system in Guangzhou before understanding its marketisation process (see Figure 1) .
The management of MSW falls into the jurisdiction of the Municipal Construction Commission (MCC). Under the supervision of MCC, the ESB is the major administrative organ in charge of the collection, transportation and disposal of MSW. It takes charge of the planning and the day-to-day operations of MSW facilities and plays a major role in formulating MSW policies. Its local offices, the District ESBs are responsible for waste collection and cleansing of main streets in their respective districts with the actual work carried out by the District Environmental Sanitation Offices (DESOs). Micro-waste collection, i.e., from the households to the community waste collection points, is administered by the Urban Management Office of the Street Offices 1 (SOs) but carried out by the ESSs who rely on the revenue from the waste collection charge for their daily running. Performance monitoring and assessment of SOs' work on environmental hygiene, including micro-waste collection, are carried out by individual DESBs. Marketisation also brings about Property Management Firm (PMF -not in Figure 1 ), which takes up the micro-waste collection and environmental hygiene duty of SO. PMFs are profit-making enterprises and not answerable to any government bodies. The operation budgets of DESBs and SOs are granted by the corresponding District Governments. In Guangzhou, the disposal and transfer of domestic waste are provided free of charge. Households are required, however, to pay for primary or micro-waste collection at a rate of RMB10 (US$ 1.32)/household/month. The charge is used to cover daily door-to-door collection of domestic waste and cleaning of the neighbourhood and their residential building. In most cases, the charge is able to cover the running cost of the micro-waste collection and neighbourhood cleaning. In addition, another RMB5 (US$ 0.66)/household/month will be levied to cover part of the waste disposal cost for household waste (Yangcheng Evening News, 2002) . Thus, compared with the average per capita expenditure of RMB800 (US$ 105.7) in waste management for Guangzhou in 2001, the cost borne directly by residents is far from being adequate to recover cost. In addition to waste management services, marketisation is also taking place in waste management facilities planning, construction and operation. Domestic and international enterprises are invited to take part in providing various municipal-level waste facilities, such as Waste to Energy (WTE) plants and sanitary landfills in the form of BuildOperate-Transfer and Design-Operate contracts, respectively.
In June, 2000, there are 84 SOs, 84 ESSs and 5852 Residents' Committees (RCs) in Guangzhou (Guangdong Home Affairs Department and Guangdong Altas Press, 2000). Even as of early 2002, other than a few exceptions, 2 most waste collection and environmental health services are provided by the ESSs under the supervision of RCs District ESBs and the Urban Management Office of SOs. How can the institutional structure of such a large community of public bodies be changed within just three years' time as initially planned?
The principles and stages of marketisation
Full-scale marketisation means that all direct waste management service providers have to be marketised. The resolution to fully marketise the waste management service in Guangzhou was first mentioned in November 1999 (Liang, 2002a) . However, the first company set up under a marketised model emerged in 1994, known as the Environmental Sanitation Beautifying and Service Centre of Guangzhou Economic and Technological Development District. In 2001, the municipal government of Guangzhou promulgated the "Guangzhou Urban Appearance and Environmental Hygiene Management Structure Reform Plan", which officially set off full marketisation of waste management system of the city. The initial target date of 2003 for the completion of waste management sector marketisation was set out in the Plan for the reform of environmental health management systems in Guangzhou in 2002 (Fei, 2002 ). Yet, in 2004, one year after the target date of marketisation completion, in its working report, the ESB (2005b) acknowledged that the pace of marketisation has been slowed in Guangzhou. In 2005, it was announced that the government would use three to five more years to complete waste management sector marketisation of the city and marketisation of the waste management sector would adopt a more flexible approach by letting local ESOs and ESSs to marketise at their own paces (Guangzhou Urban Appearance and Environment Sanitation Bureau, 2005a).
The two principles of marketisation are the "uncoupling of politics and business" and "uncoupling of policies and operational issues". Under these two axioms, direct involvement in waste management services will be taken up by non-government agencies. Governments among others will concentrate on performance monitoring (Chi, 2002, personal communication) . The marketisation plan for Guangzhou is proceeded in four stages. The first stage covers the District ESBs. Direct waste management duties of District ESOs, namely the sweeping of main roads, operation of refuse transfer stations and waste transfer to landfills will be out-contracted (See Figure 1) . District ESO crew are encouraged to form larger teams and operate as financially and administratively independent companies to compete for jobs with other tenderers. These new companies can continue to enjoy government grants for the services provided and also bid for tenders outside their service districts. Such institutional transformation from being part of a local government to a financially and administratively independent enterprise is known as institutional transformation. For example, in 1997, operation of the refuse collection fleet of Dongshan, one of the ten administrative districts of Guangzhou, was contracted to a company. The service of the company is remunerated by subsidies from the District Government and the revenue from commercial and institutional waste collection fee (Guangzhou Urban Appearance and Environment Sanitation Bureau, 2000b). Performance monitoring is taken up by a new body, known as the City Appearance and Environmental Sanitation Monitoring Office (hereafter CEO) coming under the District ESBs. Sixteen CEOs were set up in Guangzhou (Municipal Government of Guangzhou, 2002b) . By the end of 2000, about 90% of the DESOs in Guangzhou have been transformed (Guangzhou Urban Appearance and Environment Sanitation Bureau, 2000a), including also the establishment of a joint-venture cleaning company 3 that won the contract for street cleaning and waste removal for a very large district in Guangzhou (Gu, 2007, personal communication) .
The second stage involves institutional transformation of ESSs in a similar way. ESSs will also be put under the supervision of the newly formed CEOs of their respective districts (Municipal Government of Guangzhou, 2001) . Enterprises formed by the existing ESS crew will be given priority in the tendering of waste collection and cleansing service in residential areas (Guangzhou Urban Appearance and Environment Sanitation Bureau, 2000b). SOs and CEOs (if present) will jointly monitor the waste contractors for micro-waste collection and residential districts and alleys cleaning. Either CEOs or SOs will act as the granting parties of neighbourhood-level waste management projects and as the custodians of waste collection and other fees (Municipal Government of Guangzhou, 2001; Chi, 2002, personal communication) .
At present, the ESSs are required only to balance their running cost with the waste collection charges of RMB10 (US$ 1.32)/household/month (Chung and Poon, 1998) , and in some cases, payment from the District Governments. Although, theoretically after 1999, government operation has to be totally separated from any former commercial operation and the ESSs need to face full market competition and cannot enjoy the concessions granted in the transition (Guangzhou Urban Appearance and Environment Sanitation Bureau, 2000a Bureau, , 2000b . For the first two years after an ESS was transformed, the ESSs were allowed to retain their former titles as a public agency and registered as profit-making entities. The purpose is to allow them to look for business in the waste management market and to receive public grant at the same time. This is known as the "double track system".
In short, the transitional period of the second stage of marketisation for micro-waste collection and street sweeping is a kind of contract-in arrangement: instead of deploying outside/private parties, the job is consigned to in-house units with little elements of competition and is more aptly called corporatisation, an intermediate step prior to privatisation. In corporatisation, the agency is forced to operate on commercial principles and to survive by earning money while paying its bills (Savas, 2000) .
The third phase is to set up expert committees under the Guangzhou Environmental Hygiene Association for licensing waste management companies, formulating disciplinary rules for the waste management industry and exercising these rules. The Association is affiliated to the MESB and funded by membership fee. The fourth phase is to formulate new social security, taxation, investment, pricing and national assets management policies or conditions to assuage the various problems arising from marketisation (Guangzhou Urban Appearance and Environment Sanitation Bureau, 2002) . Examples of assuagement include tax exemptions for contractors in major waste facilities operations and district cleansing (Guangzhou Urban Appearance and Environment Sanitation Bureau, 2000b) and contractors may be required to employ all or most of the previous permanent workers and managers for a certain period of time or at prescribed minimum wage for these workers. In all cases, severance payment is guaranteed by the government for dismissed or retired workers as a result of the transformation (Municipal Government of Guangzhou, 2001; Tianhe ESB, 2002).
Performance assessment
In the transformation of its operational arm into financially independent entities, three measures "licensing -performance assessment -public complaints" will be taken to ensure their performance effectiveness. The first measure is the licensing of competent waste management companies. According to article 33 of the Urban Appearance and Environmental Hygiene Management Regulations for Guangzhou (1997, hereafter "Urban Appearance Regulations"), private waste collection companies must be licensed with the Municipal ESB. By early 2002, it has been reported that there were more than 300 waste management and environmental hygiene companies in Guangzhou (Guangzhou Urban Appearance and Environment Sanitation Bureau, 2002) and 187 of them has been licensed (Guangzhou Urban Appearance and Environment Sanitation Bureau, 2002) . Licensing is officially the duty of the newly formed Guangzhou Environmental Hygiene Association, which also reviews the qualifications of licensees once a year (Guangzhou Urban Appearance and Environment Sanitation Bureau, 1998). Only licensed companies are allowed to submit tenders of waste management jobs. Second, CEOs will monitor the contractors by using a series of measurable targets in waste collection and street sweeping (Guangzhou Urban Appearance and Environment Sanitation Bureau, 2000b) . The third measure is provided in a regulation that grants citizens the right to timely process of complaints on waste management (Liang, 2002c) .
The road ahead for marketisation of waste management
This section assesses how marketisation will continue and discusses the impediments to environmentally, socially and economically beneficial marketisation for waste management in Guangzhou and to some extent Mainland China. The discussion is framed into the four factors mentioned earlier.
Legislative aspect
There are two main issues of concern. First, in relation to the institutional structure of waste management agencies, what implications does marketisation bring to the waste service providers and what inconsistencies are there in the present bodies of law and regulations? Second, is there any aspect in the present body of law and regulations that may adversely affect marketisation?
Implications for the service providers
In 1995, the central government approbated the first national law on solid waste management, the Law on Solid Waste Pollution and Its prevention of the People's Republic of China, which was amended in 2004 and took effect in 2005 (hereafter, the Solid Waste Law). It laid down the principles for the management of all solid and semi-solid waste including domestic, commercial, industrial and hazardous wastes. On MSW management, the Solid Waste Law delegated the responsibility to make available waste collection, storage, transfer and disposal facilities to the corresponding municipal governments and explicitly mentioned that the provision of such services can be made through tendering (articles 38 and 39). The environmental sanitation agencies of local governments are empowered to designate waste collection points and to oversee the operations of waste disposal facilities (article 40). There are two implications on marketisation. First, in case of service disruption, local municipal governments are charged with the ultimate responsibility. Second, since only environmental sanitation agency (i.e., ESB) is empowered to designate waste collection points, this will mean that the transformed ESSs do not have the authority to single-handedly change waste collection points even if changes may optimise service provision.
Inconsistencies attenuating benefits from marketisation
Although laws and regulations have been enacted or amended to accommodate marketisation in waste management, potential suppliers of waste management services and products, especially foreign ones, should still be wary in entering the market. Oksenberg comments that many of laws and regulations in China are secret and foreigners are unable to inform themselves of the regulatory environment that they are expected to obey (2001) . Second, different foreign organisations are expected to adhere to different regulatory regimes (Oksenberg, 2001) . Third, the body of waste and environmental laws and regulations is incomplete, and sometimes contradictory to each other.
Examples germane to waste management marketisation are not lacking. The interface between the Revised Criminal Law 1997 and the 1995 version of Solid Waste Law is a case in point. Despite the revision of the Criminal Law in 1997, relevant articles in the 1995 Solid Waste Law have not been updated accordingly until 2004. Some inconsistencies noted at that time include that in article 72 of the 1995 Solid Waste Law, it was stipulated that anyone causing catastrophes as a result of the collection, storage and disposal of hazardous waste should be prosecuted in accordance with the articles 115 and 187 of the pre-revised Criminal Law. On the other hand, in the revised Criminal Law, articles 115 and 187 govern catastrophes from inflicting explosion, poisoning, fire setting, destruction of water breaks and bank forgery, respectively, without bearing any relevance to the offences referred to in the 1995 Solid Waste Law.
Another example is the inconsistency in the penalty specified in the provincial and municipal regulations. Section 6 of article 35 of the Urban Appearance Regulations defines that a fine between RMB500-2000 (US$ 66.05-264.2) shall be imposed for the offence of intentionally mixing of hazardous waste into MSW for disposal. The upper limit of the fine is, however, lower than Section 6 of article 32 of the Guangdong Municipal Solid Waste Management Regulations (2001) which empowers the authority to impose a fine ranging from RMB 10,000 to 30,000 (US$ 1321-3963) for intentional mixing of, among others, hazardous waste to MSW. Still more, the same offence attracts a fine of RMB 30,000-50,000 (US$ 3963-6605) according to article 21 of the Regulations on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes of Guangzhou (2001) . According to the Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China, if the municipal regulations are more stringent than the provincial regulations, then the municipal requirements shall prevail. Yet, in this case, it is the provincial MSW regulations that are stricter than the municipal one and then there is another municipal MSW regulation imposing even stricter penalty than the provincial regulation. So, what is the upper limit for the penalty?
Such inconsistencies inevitably cause confusion among potential (especially foreign) investors in waste management services. The variability in penalties when viewed together with other institutional changes, such as the expansion of the city boundary to cover Punyu and Huadao in 2000, will subject the private waste management sector in these two formerly non-Guangzhou areas to a lot of uncertainties and business risk. In addition, the inconsistency between the two municipal regulations also gives the impression that the same offence is subject to different regulatory regimes and different penalties.
At present, no authority is dedicated to reconcile such differences and remove the inconsistencies in the bodies of laws in Mainland China. In a word, the loopholes in the legislative systems in Mainland China give rise to high uncertainties in legal liability and are more likely to deter foreign and other private parties to widely participate in the country.
Political support
Four types of political support are needed, namely central government support, public support, local government support and waste management officials' support.
Marketisation is an important strategy to transform China from a centrally planned economy to a socialist market economy. Marketisation of traditional government functions is also in line with the desire to slim the bureaucratic structure following the 15th Party Congress in September 1997. Political commitment of the State is evident from the recent promulgation of state and provincial documents on the marketisation of the waste management sector. However, the decision to marketise the waste management sector is strictly top-down. Nee (1989) commented that the fate of market reform depends, among others, on the outcome of the struggle over the distribution of power and privilege. That is, market reform is more likely to sustain if everyone is better off even though some have gained more than others from market reform. The size of the wealth gap is, therefore, pertinent to the fate of waste management marketisation, which brings funding waste management service by "Polluter Pays Principle" (PPP) to the centre stage. Under conventional practice, "extremely low-income households" will be exempted from paying (or pay at a concessional rate) any waste-related charges. If this is confined to just a small group in the society, the adverse effect will be small. However, China is now facing a widening income gap. The Gini coefficient was 0.39 in 1999 and 0.45 in 2002 (Chan, 2001; Fong, 2002) , which are almost at alarming level. Since the Gini coefficient of Guangzhou is not available, we can only assume that it follows the main trend. As a result, public resistance in the course of marketisation especially on the issue of making waste management service provision self-financing is expected. This is the case even if the annual Gross Domestic Products growth in China is one of the highest in the world. Affordability and a growing number of "extremely low-income households" will also become an anti-charging argument for the local People's Representatives.
On the issue of local government support, even at this preliminary stage of marketisation, some local governmental sub-agencies are found to take advantage of the present restructuring in waste management to excuse themselves from the legally conferred responsibility. In the Urban Appearance and Environmental Hygiene Management Regulations promulgated by the State Council (1992), it is stipulated in article 23 that cleansing of alleys and residential districts are to be organised by the SOs. Likewise, the 1996 Management Regulations on Urban Appearance and Environmental Hygiene of Guangzhou designate the duty to manage the environmental hygiene (including waste collection) of residential districts to SOs or property management units (article 22) and the body ultimately be responsible for environmental hygiene is also the SOs (article 3). However, empirically, some SOs in Tianhe (another administrative district of Guangzhou) are found to dodge their waste management monitoring duties (Tianhe ESB, 2002) in the process of marketisation. In such cases, administrative control must be exerted to make SOs aware of their legal duties in waste management monitoring.
On the other hand, the stance of the affected waste management officials in marketisation was not at all clear. Two types of support are important. First, the support from the displaced workforce in the ESSs and District ESOs is essential. Extreme actions from them will slow down if not handicapped the marketisation in waste management. On this first issue, it appears that the assuagement policies are more before 2003 (Chi, 2002 , personal communication Deputy Director of Guangzhou ESB, Guangzhou, on 27 September). While after picking all the low hanging fruit, the support dwindled and has forced the Municipal ESB to postpone the full marketisation target to three years later and at the same time allowing local ESSs and ESOs to adopt marketisation at their own pace.
Second, with full marketisation, waste management planning, tendering of contracts, regulatory control and monitoring will become the only responsibilities of the ES agencies. Are the local-level officials ready for such changes? In particular, do they have the necessary training and resources to issue and assess tenders in a fair and transparent way required by the new system, to set appropriate penalty and bonus clauses to provide incentives for the vendor for service efficiency, and to bear the political consequence of granting jobs to unscrupulous contractors? (Lee and Moy, 2001; Au, 2001) 4 This brings us to the next criterion, administrative capacity of the contract granting party.
Administrative capacity
Savas (2000) commented that managers of government agencies generally lack experience in marketing, sales, advertising, customer relations, personnel management, recruitment, worker discipline, purchasing, cost consciousness and efficiency measures such as redesigning work processes, reassigning workers to new tasks, raising productivity and trimming the workforce to cut costs and compete against rivals. With years of insulation from market forces, the managers in the waste management agencies in Guangzhou have to develop new expertise on tender selection, contract design, performance monitoring and tackling service disruption protection under marketisation and the learning curve can be long. For instance, when the Director of Guangzhou Standard Environmental Company Ltd. who was formerly an official in the ESB recalled his earlier days to head the joint venture company, he admitted that he was totally ignorant of the high standards private sector can achieve in personnel and quality management.
Article 5 of China's Law on Tendering 1999 required all tendering activities to be conducted in a fair and open manner. 5 The spirit of this national law has been translated by Guangzhou in the new tender regulations, Interim regulations on the tendering of environmental hygiene services for Guangzhou in (2002) . Article 13 of the Pilot Regulations provides for the set up of a "monitoring unit for waste management tendering", which serves to witness the random selection of tender assessment committee, to scrutinise the tender selection process and to handle complaints on the process (article 14). Disclosure of tenders will be conducted openly and tenderers are granted the right of witnessing the disclosure process (article 16). In addition, as mentioned earlier, to guard against failure in performance monitoring, incompetent contractors and agency shirking, a "licensing-performance assessment-public complaints" mechanism has been made.
The decision to extensively impose marketisation on the waste management system in Guangzhou may increase the risk from service disruption when the municipal government no longer has its own team of people to provide similar service and the concessions for transformed ESSs and District ESOs in transition terminates. Since waste collection and street sweeping are relatively simple tasks, the consequence from service disruption is not likely to be intractable. Moreover, a tender selection criterion that screens out the two highest and the lowest bids also serves to reduce service disruption stemming from undercutting of tender costs (Tang, 2002, personal communication) . However, for the management and operation of WTE plants, LFG to power generation plants and high-standard sanitary landfills, the environmental sanitation agency of GZ may not be able to make up for any service disruption from the contractor within a short period of time.
On the whole, it appears that rules and measures are in place to guard against system failure and ensure openness and fairness in tendering. However, it should be noted that so far the aforementioned precautionary measures have not been properly tested, as full marketisation of the governmental environmental sanitation agencies has been delayed and even shelved in some districts because of the inability of local governments to efficiently disband the original workforce (Zheng, 2007, personal communication) . Thus, in the older administrative district, the number of 'contract-in' tenderers continues to be large. The real challenge from the market system when all the concessions expire may not even come in view of the lukewarm response from the Municipal ESB.
Market-based factor
Competition is at the heart of ensuring efficiency and effectiveness in privatisation and marketisation. Competition takes three forms (Brook and Smith, 2001 ):
• competition in the market: there are more than one service providers in the market and they compete directly with each other
• competition for the market: where potential service providers bid for the right to supply a monopolistic market under a time-bound franchise • yardstick competition: where performance of different service providers are compared and there is a reward system sensitive to the outcome of the comparison.
Among these three types of competition, "competition in the market" is the economically most beneficial form of market-based competition. On the other hand, yardstick competition offers much weaker incentives for service improvement than the other two kinds of competition, as the reward for good service providers is more in the form of good reputation than material reward.
At a glance, at least one form of competition is found in each tier of waste management service in Guangzhou. For instance, commercial and institutional waste generators are to some extent benefited from competition in the market as these establishments can choose among the different ESSs or cleaning companies in the vicinity. Competition for the market is found in the tendering of district cleansing and large waste facilities such as waste-to-energy plants and landfills and yardstick competition is present on micro-level waste management.
However, owing to the 'contract-in' arrangement of micro-waste collection and residential area cleansing for the initial period of marketisation, householders are not free to choose service suppliers. This not only attenuates the incentive to improve efficient from the service providers, but also stuns the growth of private waste collection companies. As a result, even though increasing number of domestic waste collection and cleansing companies is found in recent years, except for a few, these companies are very small, relatively impecunious, lack proper division of labour and know-hows (Liang, 2002b) . In all, market-based competition is weak for micro-level waste management provider and performance monitoring is provided only by SOs.
Is marketisation in the right direction?
There is no question that marketisation (or privatisation) of waste management will continue to bring real economic benefits to the society if the general assumptions for its healthy continuation can be met: real market competition is present, the tendering process is open and fair, governments and public are empowered to carry out proper monitoring.
Where waste management service is marketised and PPP charges are introduced, the financial cost of waste management will be more transparent to both the government and the waste generators who are, therefore, capable of making informed choices in their consumption of waste management services. On the technical side, when more suppliers (domestic and overseas alike) are involved in waste management, new skills and technologies can be brought into the industry and the standards of services and management can be raised.
On the question of "who will lose?", it is apparent that waste management companies especially if they are transformed from former municipal teams will be required to work harder, be more innovative and face market competition. So, they can be one of the losers if they cannot compete well in the market.
The low-income group is potentially another group of losers, as they have to shoulder the regressive waste charges. This group of losers will grow in number if the disparity in wealth continues to widen. However, the burgeoning Source Separation Programme (SSP) in Guangzhou and the presence of a large number of waste depots in the area may reduce the regressive effect on this group of people to some extent since recyclables are redeemable into cash in both recycling networks. 6 Other than providing more social security for the extremely low-income group, the regressive effect can be further mitigated if a variable (or pay-as-you-throw) waste charge instead of the present lump-sum waste charges is introduced. Thus, in the long term, variable waste charges and maintaining an extensive SSP network are essential to relieve the poor from the financial impact of waste charges brought about by marketisation.
Conclusions
It should be reiterated that the marketisation of waste management in Guangzhou is not yet a fully fledged market-led process. On the one hand, the bulk of expenses in waste management has been and still is borne by the government. On the other hand, in-contract is still dominant and real market competition is limited. Yet, the essence of marketisation in waste management, namely to uncouple politics and bureaucracy from waste management, remains a correct and commended policy determination.
Four criteria that are used to evaluate privatisation in Western societies, namely legal, political, market-based and administrative, are adopted to evaluate waste management marketisation in Guangzhou. Looking at the legal side, the inconsistencies among relevant legislation are confusing to private investors especially foreign parties. If the marketisation process is to continue, it is essential that the present body of law and regulations pertinent to waste management be thoroughly and meticulously reviewed and updated to remove inconsistencies.
The administrative capacity of the waste management agency in marketisation is strengthened with the establishment of the CEOs and the "licensing-performance assessment-public complaints" mechanism. In addition, the MSW agency is believed to have the capacity to carry out its statutory responsibility in guarding against service disruption in cleansing and waste collection service in the future. Thus, despite the generally unfavourable views on managers of government agencies in socialist countries to implement privatisation, the municipal ESB is able to institutionalise the necessary mechanisms and institutions to complement marketisation. Yet, the flip side of the coin is that some ESOs and ESSs are not able to obtain the political support to even kick-off marketisation. According to the original plan, real market competition should have already occurred. Unfortunately, the full marketisation target data has been postponed time and again. On the other hand, real market competition is in dearth throughout the stages of marketisation. Although empirical evidence from the pilot schemes so far is encouraging with impressive rise in cost effectiveness of waste management services in Guangzhou, the lack of real competition, the non-statutory nature of the monitoring agency and the legislative loopholes may hamper marketisation in extensive scale.
Despite the preliminary enthusiasm in Guangzhou's waste management marketisation, in view of the systemic problems in its socio-economic and legislative structures, its future is dependent on several factors: the responsiveness of the appropriate institution to remove the legislative inconsistencies in a timely manner, the determination of the regime to allow real market competition in the waste management sector, the willingness and affordability of the society to pay for waste management services in accordance with PPP and the effectiveness of the institution to abate the adversity associated with marketisation.
As final observations, the process of marketisation is generally associated with two instructive attributes: 1 with increasing public-private venture and increasing deployment of private capital in public utility provision, consumers and private sector will have more influential roles in the society than before 2 the establishment of the appropriate investment climate such as the newly amended laws and regulations makes the public sector more accountable to the public and its operation more transparent.
Whereas these are not cogent supports to Dinavo's (1995) thesis that privatisation in developing countries is associated with increased democracy, undoubtedly marketisation has profound implications on the democratisation of the society if it continues to burgeon.
As a result, more study on this issue and its social and environmental effect on the society will prove to be fruitful.
